diff options
author | David Kalnischkies <kalnischkies@gmail.com> | 2013-08-12 00:19:10 +0200 |
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committer | David Kalnischkies <kalnischkies@gmail.com> | 2013-08-12 18:01:37 +0200 |
commit | f9e64e7bb0c125b54f0699d9e08956a88b467a7f (patch) | |
tree | cb85210daabe3dde0ec33a05de190022c1933f2e /cmdline/apt-key | |
parent | c0a013221d296e97d68b4e9a66fef5c886d2bbb0 (diff) |
use a tmpfile for trustdb.gpg in apt-key
for some "interesting" reason gpg decides that it needs to update its
trustdb.gpg file in a --list-keys command even if right before gpg is
asked to --check-trustdb. That wouldn't be as bad if it wouldn't modify
the keyring being listed at that moment as well, which generates not
only warnings which are not a problem for us, but as the keyring
modified can be in /usr it modified files which aren't allowed to be
modified.
The suggested solution in the bugreport is running --check-trustdb
unconditionally in an 'apt-key update' call, but this command will not
be used in the future and this could still potentially bite us in
net-update or adv calls. All of this just to keep a file around, which
we do not need…
The commit therefore switches to the use of a temporary created
trusted.gpg file for everyone and asks gpg to not try to update the
trustdb after its intial creation, which seems to avoid the problem
altogether.
It is using your also faked secring btw as calling the check-trustdb
without a keyring is a lot slower …
Closes: #687611
Thanks: Andreas Beckmann for the initial patch!
Diffstat (limited to 'cmdline/apt-key')
-rwxr-xr-x | cmdline/apt-key | 36 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/cmdline/apt-key b/cmdline/apt-key index 4596e4a47..e010e6e90 100755 --- a/cmdline/apt-key +++ b/cmdline/apt-key @@ -3,26 +3,26 @@ set -e unset GREP_OPTIONS -# We don't use a secret keyring, of course, but gpg panics and -# implodes if there isn't one available -SECRETKEYRING="$(mktemp)" -CURRENTTRAP="rm -f '${SECRETKEYRING}';" -trap "${CURRENTTRAP}" 0 HUP INT QUIT ILL ABRT FPE SEGV PIPE TERM -GPG_CMD="gpg --ignore-time-conflict --no-options --no-default-keyring --secret-keyring ${SECRETKEYRING}" +GPG_CMD="gpg --ignore-time-conflict --no-options --no-default-keyring" -eval $(apt-config shell TRUSTDBDIR Dir::Etc/d) -if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || [ -r "${TRUSTDBDIR}/trustdb.gpg" ]; then - # root can read/create the file as needed, so use the default - true -else - # gpg needs a trustdb to function, but it can't be invalid (not even empty) - # so we create a tempory directory to store our fresh readable trustdb in - TRUSTDBDIR="$(mktemp -d)" - CURRENTTRAP="${CURRENTTRAP} rm -rf '${TRUSTDBDIR}';" - trap "${CURRENTTRAP}" 0 HUP INT QUIT ILL ABRT FPE SEGV PIPE TERM - chmod 700 "$TRUSTDBDIR" -fi +# gpg needs a trustdb to function, but it can't be invalid (not even empty) +# so we create a temporary directory to store our fresh readable trustdb in +TRUSTDBDIR="$(mktemp -d)" +CURRENTTRAP="${CURRENTTRAP} rm -rf '${TRUSTDBDIR}';" +trap "${CURRENTTRAP}" 0 HUP INT QUIT ILL ABRT FPE SEGV PIPE TERM +chmod 700 "$TRUSTDBDIR" +# We also don't use a secret keyring, of course, but gpg panics and +# implodes if there isn't one available - and writeable for imports +SECRETKEYRING="${TRUSTDBDIR}/secring.gpg" +touch $SECRETKEYRING +GPG_CMD="$GPG_CMD --secret-keyring $SECRETKEYRING" GPG_CMD="$GPG_CMD --trustdb-name ${TRUSTDBDIR}/trustdb.gpg" + +# now create the trustdb with an (empty) dummy keyring +$GPG_CMD --quiet --check-trustdb --keyring $SECRETKEYRING +# and make sure that gpg isn't trying to update the file +GPG_CMD="$GPG_CMD --no-auto-check-trustdb --trust-model always" + GPG="$GPG_CMD" MASTER_KEYRING="" |