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| author | David Kalnischkies <david@kalnischkies.de> | 2015-06-06 12:28:00 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David Kalnischkies <david@kalnischkies.de> | 2015-06-09 12:57:35 +0200 |
| commit | 448c38bdcd72b52f11ec5f326f822cf57653f81c (patch) | |
| tree | 98f26e9d477e720c3448773f398e6b13e0e431c7 /test/integration/test-apt-update-nofallback | |
| parent | 58702f8563a443a7c6e66253b259c2488b877290 (diff) | |
rework hashsum verification in the acquire system
Having every item having its own code to verify the file(s) it handles
is an errorprune process and easy to break, especially if items move
through various stages (download, uncompress, patching, …). With a giant
rework we centralize (most of) the verification to have a better
enforcement rate and (hopefully) less chance for bugs, but it breaks the
ABI bigtime in exchange – and as we break it anyway, it is broken even
harder.
It shouldn't effect most frontends as they don't deal with the acquire
system at all or implement their own items, but some do and will need to
be patched (might be an opportunity to use apt on-board material).
The theory is simple: Items implement methods to decide if hashes need to
be checked (in this stage) and to return the expected hashes for this
item (in this stage). The verification itself is done in worker message
passing which has the benefit that a hashsum error is now a proper error
for the acquire system rather than a Done() which is later revised to a
Failed().
Diffstat (limited to 'test/integration/test-apt-update-nofallback')
| -rwxr-xr-x | test/integration/test-apt-update-nofallback | 11 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/test/integration/test-apt-update-nofallback b/test/integration/test-apt-update-nofallback index db4430ea3..f132bcf8e 100755 --- a/test/integration/test-apt-update-nofallback +++ b/test/integration/test-apt-update-nofallback @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Description: an autogenerated evil package EOF # avoid ims hit touch -d '+1hour' aptarchive/dists/unstable/main/binary-i386/Packages + compressfile aptarchive/dists/unstable/main/binary-i386/Packages } assert_update_is_refused_and_last_good_state_used() @@ -87,16 +88,16 @@ test_from_inrelease_to_unsigned_with_override() { # setup archive with InRelease file setupaptarchive_with_lists_clean - # FIXME: is not what the server reported 4104 4106 - testsuccess aptget update #-o Debug::pkgAcquire::Worker=1 + testsuccess aptget update # simulate moving to a unsigned but otherwise valid repo simulate_mitm_and_inject_evil_package - generatereleasefiles + generatereleasefiles '+2 hours' + find $APTARCHIVE -name '*Packages*' -exec touch -d '+2 hours' {} \; # and ensure we can update to it (with enough force) testwarning aptget update --allow-insecure-repositories \ - -o Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories=1 + -o Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories=1 -o Debug::pkgAcquire::Worker=1 -o Debug::pkgAcquire::Auth=1 # but that the individual packages are still considered untrusted testfailureequal "WARNING: The following packages cannot be authenticated! evil @@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ test_inrelease_to_invalid_inrelease() listcurrentlistsdirectory > lists.before # now remove InRelease and subvert Release do no longer verify - sed -i 's/Codename.*/Codename: evil!'/ $APTARCHIVE/dists/unstable/InRelease + sed -i 's/^Codename:.*/Codename: evil!/' $APTARCHIVE/dists/unstable/InRelease inject_evil_package testwarningequal "W: An error occurred during the signature verification. The repository is not updated and the previous index files will be used. GPG error: file: unstable InRelease: The following signatures were invalid: BADSIG 5A90D141DBAC8DAE Joe Sixpack (APT Testcases Dummy) <joe@example.org> |