diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | CMakeLists.txt | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc | 21 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | apt-inst/deb/debfile.cc | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | debian/changelog | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/apt-verbatim.ent | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/po/apt-doc.pot | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | po/apt-all.pot | 4 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | test/integration/test-cve-2020-27350 | 25 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | test/interactive-helper/CMakeLists.txt | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc | 325 |
12 files changed, 424 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt index 08af5b730..979202702 100644 --- a/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/CMakeLists.txt @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ check_cxx_target(HAVE_FMV_SSE42_AND_CRC32DI "sse4.2" "__builtin_ia32_crc32di(0, # Configure some variables like package, version and architecture. set(PACKAGE ${PROJECT_NAME}) set(PACKAGE_MAIL "APT Development Team <deity@lists.debian.org>") -set(PACKAGE_VERSION "1.8.2.1") +set(PACKAGE_VERSION "1.8.2.2") if (NOT DEFINED DPKG_DATADIR) execute_process(COMMAND ${PERL_EXECUTABLE} -MDpkg -e "print $Dpkg::DATADIR;" diff --git a/apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc b/apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc index 5cb43c690..6d4a1f158 100644 --- a/apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc +++ b/apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc @@ -94,7 +94,12 @@ bool ARArchive::LoadHeaders() delete Memb; return _error->Error(_("Invalid archive member header")); } - + + if (Left < 0 || Memb->Size > static_cast<unsigned long long>(Left)) + { + delete Memb; + return _error->Error(_("Invalid archive member header")); + } // Check for an extra long name string if (memcmp(Head.Name,"#1/",3) == 0) { @@ -106,6 +111,13 @@ bool ARArchive::LoadHeaders() delete Memb; return _error->Error(_("Invalid archive member header")); } + + if (Len > Memb->Size) + { + delete Memb; + return _error->Error(_("Invalid archive member header")); + } + if (File.Read(S,Len) == false) { delete Memb; diff --git a/apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc b/apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc index 19ac1c8b1..cbee4d12a 100644 --- a/apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc +++ b/apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc @@ -55,7 +55,17 @@ struct ExtractTar::TarHeader char Major[8]; char Minor[8]; }; - + +// We need to read long names (names and link targets) into memory, so let's +// have a limit (shamelessly stolen from libarchive) to avoid people OOMing +// us with large streams. +static const unsigned long long APT_LONGNAME_LIMIT = 1048576llu; + +// A file size limit that we allow extracting. Currently, that's 128 GB. +// We also should leave some wiggle room for code adding files to it, and +// possibly conversion for signed, so this should not be larger than like 2**62. +static const unsigned long long APT_FILESIZE_LIMIT = 1llu << 37; + // ExtractTar::ExtractTar - Constructor /*{{{*/ // --------------------------------------------------------------------- /* */ @@ -170,6 +180,11 @@ bool ExtractTar::Go(pkgDirStream &Stream) StrToNum(Tar->Minor,Itm.Minor,sizeof(Tar->Minor),8) == false) return _error->Error(_("Corrupted archive")); + // Security check. Prevents overflows below the code when rounding up in skip/copy code, + // and provides modest protection against decompression bombs. + if (Itm.Size > APT_FILESIZE_LIMIT) + return _error->Error("Tar member too large: %llu > %llu bytes", Itm.Size, APT_FILESIZE_LIMIT); + // Grab the filename and link target: use last long name if one was // set, otherwise use the header value as-is, but remember that it may // fill the entire 100-byte block and needs to be zero-terminated. @@ -222,6 +237,8 @@ bool ExtractTar::Go(pkgDirStream &Stream) { unsigned long long Length = Itm.Size; unsigned char Block[512]; + if (Length > APT_LONGNAME_LIMIT) + return _error->Error("Long name to large: %llu bytes > %llu bytes", Length, APT_LONGNAME_LIMIT); while (Length > 0) { if (InFd.Read(Block,sizeof(Block),true) == false) @@ -241,6 +258,8 @@ bool ExtractTar::Go(pkgDirStream &Stream) { unsigned long long Length = Itm.Size; unsigned char Block[512]; + if (Length > APT_LONGNAME_LIMIT) + return _error->Error("Long name to large: %llu bytes > %llu bytes", Length, APT_LONGNAME_LIMIT); while (Length > 0) { if (InFd.Read(Block,sizeof(Block),true) == false) diff --git a/apt-inst/deb/debfile.cc b/apt-inst/deb/debfile.cc index f8d752e7f..bef0cd0d8 100644 --- a/apt-inst/deb/debfile.cc +++ b/apt-inst/deb/debfile.cc @@ -184,11 +184,23 @@ bool debDebFile::ControlExtract::DoItem(Item &Itm,int &Fd) // --------------------------------------------------------------------- /* This sets up to extract the control block member file into a memory block of just the right size. All other files go into the bit bucket. */ + +// Upper size limit for control files. Two reasons for having a limit here: +// +// 1. We read those files into memory and want to avoid being killed by OOM +// +// 2. We allocate (Itm.Size+2)-large arrays, so this can overflow if Itm.Size +// becomes 2**64-2 or larger. This is obviously +// +// 64 MiB seems like a terribly large size that everyone should be happy with. +static const unsigned long long DEB_CONTROL_SIZE_LIMIT = 64 * 1024 * 1024; bool debDebFile::MemControlExtract::DoItem(Item &Itm,int &Fd) { // At the control file, allocate buffer memory. if (Member == Itm.Name) { + if (Itm.Size > DEB_CONTROL_SIZE_LIMIT) + return _error->Error("Control file too large: %llu > %llu bytes", Itm.Size, DEB_CONTROL_SIZE_LIMIT); delete [] Control; Control = new char[Itm.Size+2]; IsControl = true; @@ -237,6 +249,9 @@ bool debDebFile::MemControlExtract::Read(debDebFile &Deb) record. */ bool debDebFile::MemControlExtract::TakeControl(const void *Data,unsigned long long Size) { + if (Size > DEB_CONTROL_SIZE_LIMIT) + return _error->Error("Control file too large: %llu > %llu bytes", Size, DEB_CONTROL_SIZE_LIMIT); + delete [] Control; Control = new char[Size+2]; Length = Size; diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog index ec4769b9b..44f80d187 100644 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog @@ -1,3 +1,17 @@ +apt (1.8.2.2) buster-security; urgency=high + + * SECURITY UPDATE: Integer overflow in parsing (LP: #1899193) + - apt-pkg/contrib/arfile.cc: add extra checks. + - apt-pkg/contrib/tarfile.cc: limit tar item sizes to 128 GiB + - apt-pkg/deb/debfile.cc: limit control file sizes to 64 MiB + - test/*: add tests. + - CVE-2020-27350 + * Additional hardening: + - apt-pkg/contrib/tarfile.cc: Limit size of long names and links to 1 MiB + * Fix autopkgtest regression in 1.8.2.1 security update + + -- Julian Andres Klode <jak@debian.org> Mon, 07 Dec 2020 12:31:04 +0100 + apt (1.8.2.1) buster-security; urgency=high * SECURITY UPDATE: Out of bounds read in ar, tar implementations (LP: #1878177) diff --git a/doc/apt-verbatim.ent b/doc/apt-verbatim.ent index 54c81b8f1..b8c33d072 100644 --- a/doc/apt-verbatim.ent +++ b/doc/apt-verbatim.ent @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ "> <!-- this will be updated by 'prepare-release' --> -<!ENTITY apt-product-version "1.8.2.1"> +<!ENTITY apt-product-version "1.8.2.2"> <!-- (Code)names for various things used all over the place --> <!ENTITY debian-oldstable-codename "stretch"> diff --git a/doc/po/apt-doc.pot b/doc/po/apt-doc.pot index c0ec0859f..d143d0a6c 100644 --- a/doc/po/apt-doc.pot +++ b/doc/po/apt-doc.pot @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ #, fuzzy msgid "" msgstr "" -"Project-Id-Version: apt-doc 1.8.2.1\n" +"Project-Id-Version: apt-doc 1.8.2.2\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: APT Development Team <deity@lists.debian.org>\n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-05-12 18:00+0000\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-02 17:16+0000\n" "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n" diff --git a/po/apt-all.pot b/po/apt-all.pot index 8d005b831..373c4052c 100644 --- a/po/apt-all.pot +++ b/po/apt-all.pot @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ #, fuzzy msgid "" msgstr "" -"Project-Id-Version: apt 1.8.2.1\n" +"Project-Id-Version: apt 1.8.2.2\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: APT Development Team <deity@lists.debian.org>\n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-05-12 18:00+0000\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-02 17:16+0000\n" "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n" diff --git a/test/integration/test-cve-2020-27350 b/test/integration/test-cve-2020-27350 new file mode 100755 index 000000000..a32bf95e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/integration/test-cve-2020-27350 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +#!/bin/sh +set -e + +TESTDIR="$(readlink -f "$(dirname "$0")")" +. "$TESTDIR/framework" +setupenvironment +configarchitecture "amd64" + +${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/createdeb-cve-2020-27350 crash crash.deb +testequal "E: Invalid archive member header" runapt ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/testdeb ./crash.deb + +${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/createdeb-cve-2020-27350 loop loop.deb +testequal "E: Invalid archive member header" runapt ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/testdeb ./loop.deb + +${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/createdeb-cve-2020-27350 long-name long-name.deb +testequal "E: Long name to large: 67108865 bytes > 1048576 bytes" runapt ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/extract-control long-name.deb control + +${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/createdeb-cve-2020-27350 long-link long-link.deb +testequal "E: Long name to large: 67108865 bytes > 1048576 bytes" runapt ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/extract-control long-link.deb control + +${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/createdeb-cve-2020-27350 long-control long-control.deb +testequal "E: Control file too large: 67108865 > 67108864 bytes" runapt ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/extract-control long-control.deb control + +${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/createdeb-cve-2020-27350 too-long-control too-long-control.deb +testequal "E: Tar member too large: $((128 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 + 1)) > $((128 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024)) bytes" runapt ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/extract-control too-long-control.deb control diff --git a/test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember b/test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember index ec2163bf6..1e095eef3 100755 --- a/test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember +++ b/test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember @@ -10,19 +10,19 @@ setupaptarchive # this used to crash, but it should treat it as an invalid member header touch ' ' ar -q test.deb ' ' -testsuccessequal "E: Invalid archive member header" ${BUILDDIRECTORY}/../test/interactive-helper/testdeb test.deb +testsuccessequal "E: Invalid archive member header" ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/testdeb test.deb rm test.deb touch 'x' ar -q test.deb 'x' -testsuccessequal "E: This is not a valid DEB archive, missing 'debian-binary' member" ${BUILDDIRECTORY}/../test/interactive-helper/testdeb test.deb +testsuccessequal "E: This is not a valid DEB archive, missing 'debian-binary' member" ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/testdeb test.deb # <name><size> [ other fields] - name is not nul terminated here, it ends in . msgmsg "Unterminated ar member name" printf '!<arch>\0120123456789ABCDE.A123456789A.01234.01234.0123456.012345678.0.' > test.deb -testsuccessequal "E: Invalid archive member header" ${BUILDDIRECTORY}/../test/interactive-helper/testdeb test.deb +testsuccessequal "E: Invalid archive member header" ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/testdeb test.deb # unused source code for generating $tar below @@ -85,4 +85,4 @@ cp control.tar.gz data.tar.gz touch debian-binary rm test.deb ar -q test.deb debian-binary control.tar.gz data.tar.gz -testsuccessequal "W: Unknown TAR header type 88" ${BUILDDIRECTORY}/../test/interactive-helper/testdeb test.deb +testsuccessequal "W: Unknown TAR header type 88" ${APTTESTHELPERSBINDIR}/testdeb test.deb diff --git a/test/interactive-helper/CMakeLists.txt b/test/interactive-helper/CMakeLists.txt index 5a32ca17e..0de7d9c5f 100644 --- a/test/interactive-helper/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/test/interactive-helper/CMakeLists.txt @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ add_executable(aptdropprivs aptdropprivs.cc) target_link_libraries(aptdropprivs apt-pkg) add_executable(test_fileutl test_fileutl.cc) target_link_libraries(test_fileutl apt-pkg) +add_executable(createdeb-cve-2020-27350 createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc) + add_library(noprofile SHARED libnoprofile.c) target_link_libraries(noprofile ${CMAKE_DL_LIBS}) diff --git a/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc b/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8b9619469 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +struct Header +{ + char Name[16]; + char MTime[12]; + char UID[6]; + char GID[6]; + char Mode[8]; + char Size[10]; + char Magic[2]; +}; + +struct TarHeader +{ + char Name[100]; + char Mode[8]; + char UserID[8]; + char GroupID[8]; + char Size[12]; + char MTime[12]; + char Checksum[8]; + char LinkFlag; + char LinkName[100]; + char MagicNumber[8]; + char UserName[32]; + char GroupName[32]; + char Major[8]; + char Minor[8]; +}; + +// Call `write` and check the result. +static void write_chk(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count) +{ + const ssize_t wr = write(fd, buf, count); + if (wr < 0) + { + const int err = errno; + fprintf(stderr, "Write failed: %s\n", strerror(err)); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + if ((size_t)wr != count) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Incomplete write.\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } +} + +// Triggers a negative integer overflow at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/tree/apt-pkg/contrib/arfile.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=4c264e60b524855b211751e1632ba48526f6b44d#n116: +// +// Memb->Size -= Len; +// +// Due to the integer overflow, the value of Memb->Size is 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. +// This leads to an out-of-memory error at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/python-apt/tree/python/arfile.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=0f7cc93acdb51d943114f1cd79002288c4ca4d24#n602: +// +// char* value = new char[member->Size]; +// +// The out-of-memory error causes aptd to crash. +static void createdeb_crash(const int fd) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + + memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "#1/13 ", sizeof(h.Name)); + strcpy(h.Size, "12"); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + write_chk(fd, "debian-binary", 13); +} + +// Triggers an infinite loop in `ARArchive::LoadHeaders()`. +// The bug is due to the use of `strtoul` at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/tree/apt-pkg/contrib/strutl.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=4c264e60b524855b211751e1632ba48526f6b44d#n1169: +// +// Res = strtoul(S,&End,Base); +// +// The problem is that `strtoul` accepts negative numbers. We exploit that here by setting the size string to "-60". +static void createdeb_loop(const int fd) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + + memcpy(h.Name, "#1/20 ", sizeof(h.Name)); + strcpy(h.Size, "-60"); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + char buf[20]; + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + write_chk(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +// Leaks a file descriptor in `debfile_new()`: +// +// https://git.launchpad.net/python-apt/tree/python/arfile.cc?h=2.0.0#n588 +// +// If the .deb file is invalid then the function returns without deleting +// `self`, which means that the file descriptor isn't closed. +static void createdeb_leakfd(const int fd) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); +} + +static void set_checksum(unsigned char block[512]) +{ + struct TarHeader *tar = (struct TarHeader *)&block[0]; + memset(tar->Checksum, ' ', sizeof(tar->Checksum)); + uint32_t sum = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < 512; i++) + { + sum += block[i]; + } + snprintf(tar->Checksum, sizeof(tar->Checksum), "%o", sum); +} +static void base256_encode(char *Str, unsigned long long Num, unsigned int Len) +{ + Str += Len; + while (Len-- > 0) { + *--Str = static_cast<char>(Num & 0xff); + Num >>= 8; + } + + *Str |= 0x80; // mark as base256 +} + +// Create a deb with a control.tar that contains a too large file or link name (GNU extension) +static void createdeb_bigtarfilelength(const int fd, int flag, unsigned long long size = 64llu * 1024 * 1024 + 1) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "debian-binary/ ", sizeof(h.Name)); + h.MTime[0] = '0'; + h.UID[0] = '0'; + h.GID[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3); + h.Size[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2); + + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar/ ", sizeof(h.Name)); + h.MTime[0] = '0'; + h.UID[0] = '0'; + h.GID[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3); + h.Size[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2); + + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar/ ", sizeof(h.Name)); + h.MTime[0] = '0'; + h.UID[0] = '0'; + h.GID[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3); + memcpy(h.Size, "512", 3); + memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2); + + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + union + { + struct TarHeader t; + unsigned char buf[512]; + } t; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sizeof(t.buf); i++) + t.buf[i] = '7'; + memcpy(t.t.Name, "control\0 ", 16); + memcpy(t.t.UserName, "userName", 8); + memcpy(t.t.GroupName, "thisIsAGroupNamethisIsAGroupName", 32); + t.t.LinkFlag = flag; + base256_encode(t.t.Size, size, sizeof(t.t.Size)); + memset(t.t.Checksum, ' ', sizeof(t.t.Checksum)); + + unsigned long sum = 0; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sizeof(t.buf); i++) + sum += t.buf[i]; + + int written = sprintf(t.t.Checksum, "%lo", sum); + for (unsigned int i = written; i < sizeof(t.t.Checksum); i++) + t.t.Checksum[i] = ' '; + + write_chk(fd, t.buf, sizeof(t.buf)); +} + +static void createdeb_test(const int fd) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "debian-binary ", sizeof(h.Name)); + strcpy(h.Size, "4"); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + static const char *debian_binary = "2.0\n"; + write_chk(fd, debian_binary, strlen(debian_binary)); + + static const char *control = + "Architecture: all\n" + "Package: kevsh\n\n"; + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + snprintf(h.Size, sizeof(h.Size), "%ld", (size_t)512 + 512); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + unsigned char block[512]; + memset(block, 0, sizeof(block)); + struct TarHeader *tar = (struct TarHeader *)&block[0]; + strcpy(tar->Name, "control"); + strcpy(tar->Mode, "644"); + snprintf(tar->Size, sizeof(tar->Size), "%lo", strlen(control)); + set_checksum(block); + write_chk(fd, block, sizeof(block)); + + memset(block, 0, sizeof(block)); + strcpy((char *)block, control); + write_chk(fd, block, sizeof(block)); +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + if (argc != 3) + { + const char *progname = argc > 0 ? argv[0] : "a.out"; + fprintf( + stderr, + "usage: %s <mode> <filename>\n" + "modes: loop, segv, leakfd\n", + progname); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + const char *mode = argv[1]; + const char *filename = argv[2]; + + const int fd = open(filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 00644); + if (fd < 0) + { + const int err = errno; + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(err)); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + if (strcmp(mode, "crash") == 0) + { + createdeb_crash(fd); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "loop") == 0) + { + createdeb_loop(fd); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "leakfd") == 0) + { + createdeb_leakfd(fd); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "long-name") == 0) + { + createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, 'L'); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "long-link") == 0) + { + createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, 'K'); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "long-control") == 0) + { + createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, '0'); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "too-long-control") == 0) + { + createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, '0', 128llu * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 + 1); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "test") == 0) + { + createdeb_test(fd); + } + else + { + fprintf(stderr, "Mode not recognized: %s\n", mode); + } + + close(fd); + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} |