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This needs a fair amount of changes elsewhere in the code,
hence this is separate from the previous commits.
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Telling the acquire system which keys caused the gpgv method to
succeed allows us for now just a casual check if the gpgv method
really executed catching bugs like CVE-2018-0501, but we will make use
of the information for better features in the following commits.
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Having a method take a bunch of string vectors is bad style, so we
change this to a wrapping struct and adapt the rest of the code brushing
it up slightly in the process, which results even in a slightly "better"
debug output, no practical change otherwise.
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
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A user can specify multiple fingerprints for a while now, so its seems
counter-intuitive to support only one keyring, especially if this isn't
really checked or enforced and while unlikely mixtures of both should
work properly, too, instead of a kinda random behaviour.
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If we limit a file to be signed by a certain key it should usually
accept also being signed by any of this keys subkeys instead of
requiring each subkey to be listed explicitly. If the later is really
wanted we support now also the same syntax as gpg does with appending an
exclamation mark at the end of the fingerprint to force no mapping.
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gpgs DETAILS documentation file declares that GOODSIG could report keyid
or fingerprint since gpg2, but for the time being it is still keyid
only. Who knows if that will ever change as that feels like an interface
break with dangerous security implications, but lets be better safe than
sorry especially as the code dealing with signed-by keyids is prepared
for this already. This code is rewritten still to have them all use the
same code for this type of problem.
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This makes it easier to see which headers includes what.
The changes were done by running
git grep -l '#\s*include' \
| grep -E '.(cc|h)$' \
| xargs sed -i -E 's/(^\s*)#(\s*)include/\1#\2 include/'
To modify all include lines by adding a space, and then running
./git-clang-format.sh.
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Most of them in (old) code comments. The two instances of user visible
string changes the po files of the manpages are fixed up as well.
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
Reported-By: spellintian
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Change the trust level check to allow downgrading an Untrusted
option to weak (APT::Hashes::SHA1::Weak "yes";), so it prints
a warning instead of an error; and change the default values
for SHA1 and RIPE-MD/160 from Weak to Untrusted.
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We report warnings from apt-key this way already since
29c590951f812d9e9c4f17706e34f2c3315fb1f6, so reporting errors seems like
a good addition. Most of those errors aren't really from apt-key
through, but from the code setting up and actually calling it which used
to just print to stderr which might or might not intermix them with
(other) progress lines in update calls. Having them as proper error
messages in the system means that the errors are actually collected
later on for the list instead of ending up with our relatively generic
but in those cases bogus hint regarding "is gpgv installed?".
The effective difference is minimal as the errors apply mostly to
systems which have far worse problems than a not as nice looking error
message, which makes this pretty hard to test – but at least now the
hint that your system is broken can be read in proper order (= there
aren't many valid cases in which the permissions of /tmp are messed up…).
LP: #1522988
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In gpgv1 GOODSIG (and the other messages of status-fd) are documented as
sending the long keyid. In gpgv2 it is documented to be either long
keyid or the fingerprint. At the moment it is still the long keyid, but
the documentation hints at the possibility of changing this.
We care about this for Signed-By support as we detect this way if the
right fingerprint has signed this file (or not). The check itself is
done via VALIDSIG which always is a fingerprint, but there must also be
a GOODSIG (as expired sigs are valid, too) found to be accepted which
wouldn't be found in the fingerprint-case and the signature hence
refused.
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In 105503b4b470c124bc0c271bd8a50e25ecbe9133 we got a warning implemented
for unreadable files which greatly improves the behavior of apt update
already as everything will work as long as we don't need the keys
included in these files. The behavior if they are needed is still
strange through as update will fail claiming missing keys and a manual
test (which the user will likely perform as root) will be successful.
Passing the new warning generated by apt-key through to apt is a bit
strange from an interface point of view, but basically duplicating the
warning code in multiple places doesn't feel right either. That means we
have no translation for the message through as apt-key has no i18n yet.
It also means that if the user has a bunch of sources each of them will
generate a warning for each unreadable file which could result in quite
a few duplicated warnings, but "too many" is better than none.
Closes: 834973
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The https method implemented for a long while now a hardcoded fallback
to the same options in http, which, while it works, is rather inflexible
if we want to allow the methods to use another name to change their
behavior slightly, like apt-transport-tor does to https – most of the
diff being s#https#tor#g which then fails to do the full circle
fallthrough tor -> https -> http for https sources. With this config
infrastructure this could be implemented now.
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We use a wild mixture of C and C++ ways of generating output, so having
a consistent world-view in both styles sounds like a good idea and
should help in preventing regressions.
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gpg doesn't give use a UID on NODATA, which we were "expecting" (but not
using for anything), but just an error number. Instead of collecting
these as badsigners which will trigger a "invald signature" error with
remarks like "NODATA 1" we instead adapt a message similar to the NODATA
error of a clearsigned file (which is actually not reached anymore as we
split them up, which fails with a NOSPLIT error, which uses the same
general error message).
In other words: Not a security relevant change, just a user experience
improvement as we now point them to the most likely cause of the
problem instead of saying "invalid signature" which would point them in
the direction of the archive being broken (for everyone) instead.
Closes: 823746
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A keyring file can include multiple keys, so its only fair for
transitions and such to support multiple fingerprints as well.
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We parse the messages we receive into two big categories: Most of the
messages have a keyid as well as a userid and as they are errors we want
to show the userids as well. The other category is also errors, but have
no userid (like NO_PUBKEY). Explicitly expressing this in code should
make it a bit easier to look at and it also help in dropping additional
fields or just the newline at the end consistently.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Daniel Kahn Gillmor highlights in the bugreport that security isn't
improving by having the user import additional keys – especially as
importing keys securely is hard.
The bugreport was initially about dropping the warning to a notice, but
in given the previously mentioned observation and the fact that we
weren't printing a warning (or a notice) for expired or revoked keys
providing a signature we drop it completely as the code to display a
message if this was the only key is in another path – and is considered
critical.
Closes: 618445
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Signatures on data can have an expiration date, too, which we hadn't
handled previously explicitly (no problem – gpg still has a non-zero
exit code so apt notices the invalid signature) so the error message
wasn't as helpful as it could be (aka mentioning the key signing it).
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The upstream documentation says about KEYEXPIRED:
"This status line is not very useful". Indeed, it doesn't mention which
key is expired, and suggests to use the other message which does.
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Introduces APT::Hashes::<NAME> with entries Untrusted and Weak
which can be set to true to cause the hash to be treated as
untrusted and/or weak.
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Our own gpgv method can declare a digest algorithm as untrusted and
handles these as worthless signatures. If gpgv comes with inbuilt
untrusted (which is called weak in official terminology) which it e.g.
does for MD5 in recent versions we should handle it in the same way.
To check this we use the most uncommon still fully trusted hash as a
configureable one via a hidden config option to toggle through all of
the three states a hash can be in.
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Using erase(pos) is invalid in our case here as pos must be a valid and
derefenceable iterator, which isn't the case for an end-iterator (like
if we had no good signature).
The problem runs deeper still through as VALIDSIG is a keyid while
GOODSIG is just a longid so comparing them will always fail.
Closes: 818910
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There was a complaint that, in the previous message,
the key fingerprint could be mistaken for a SHA1 digest
due to the (SHA1) after it.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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This should be easy to extend in the future and allow us to simplify
the error handling cases somewhat.
Thanks: Ron Lee for wording suggestions
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We will drop support for those in the future.
Also adjust the std::array to be a std::vector, as that's easier to
maintain.
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We added weak signatures to BadSigners, meaning that a Release file
signed by both a weak signature and a strong signature would be
rejected; preventing people from migrating from DSA to RSA keys
in a sane way.
Instead of using BadSigners, treat weak signatures like expired
keys: They are no good signatures, and they are worthless.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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This keeps a list of weak digest algorithms. For now, only MD5
is disabled, as SHA1 breaks to many repos.
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This reverts commit 76a71a1237d22c1990efbc19ce0e02aacf572576.
That commit broke the test suite.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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ERRSIG is created whenever a key uses an unknown/weak digest
algorithm, for example. This allows us to report a more useful
error than just "unknown apt-key error.":
The following signatures were invalid: ERRSIG 13B00F1FD2C19886 1 2 01 1457609403 5
While still not being the best reportable error message, it's
better than unknown apt-key error and hopefully redirects users
to complain to their repository owners.
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Allows users who know what they are getting themselves into with this
trick to e.g. disable privilege dropping for e.g. file:// until they can
fix up the permissions on those repositories. It helps also the test
framework and people with a similar setup (= me) to run in less modified
environments.
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C++11 adds the 'override' specifier to mark that a method is overriding
a base class method and error out if not. We hide it in the APT_OVERRIDE
macro to ensure that we keep compiling in pre-c++11 standards.
Reported-By: clang-modernize -add-override -override-macros
Git-Dch: Ignore
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The previous commit returns to the possibility of using just gpgv for
verification proposes. There is one problem through: We can't enforce a
specific keyid without using gpg, but our acquire method can as it
parses gpgv output anyway, so it can deal with good signatures from not
expected signatures and treats them as unknown keys instead.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Limits which key(s) can be used to sign a repository. Not immensely useful
from a security perspective all by itself, but if the user has
additional measures in place to confine a repository (like pinning) an
attacker who gets the key for such a repository is limited to its
potential and can't use the key to sign its attacks for an other (maybe
less limited) repository… (yes, this is as weak as it sounds, but having
the capability might come in handy for implementing other stuff later).
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We use it in other places already as well even though it is farly new
addition to the POSIX family with 2008, but rolling our own here is
really something which should be avoided in such a important method.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Do not drop privileges in the methods when using a older version of
libapt that does not support the chown magic in partial/ yet. To
do this DropPrivileges() now will ignore a empty Apt::Sandbox::User.
Cleanup all hardcoded _apt along the way.
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feature/acq-trans
Conflicts:
apt-pkg/acquire-item.cc
apt-pkg/acquire-item.h
methods/gpgv.cc
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Git-Dch: Ignore
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feature/acq-trans
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Add a new "Debian-apt" user that owns the /var/lib/apt/lists
and /var/cache/apt/archive directories. The methods
http, https, ftp, gpgv, gzip switch to this user when they
start.
Thanks to Julian and "ioerror" and tors "switch_id()" code.
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The old way of handling this was that pkgAcqMetaIndex was responsible
to check/move both Release and Release.gpg in place. This breaks
the assumption of the transaction that each pkgAcquire::Item has
a single File that its responsible for.
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Beside being a bit cleaner it hopefully also resolves oddball problems
I have with high levels of parallel jobs.
Git-Dch: Ignore
Reported-By: iwyu (include-what-you-use)
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Reported-By: cppcheck
Git-Dch: Ignore
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With the selfgrown splitting we got the problem of not recovering
from networks which just reply with invalid data like those sending
us login pages to authenticate with the network (e.g. hotels) back.
The good thing about the InRelease file is that we know that it must
be clearsigned (a Release file might or might not have a detached sig)
so if we get a file but are unable to split it something is seriously
wrong, so there is not much point in trying further.
The Acquire system already looks out for a NODATA error from gpgv,
so this adds a new error message sent to the acquire system in case
the splitting we do now ourselves failed including this magic word.
Closes: #712486
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- ExecGPGV is a method which should never return, so mark it as such
and fix the inconsistency of returning in error cases
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- rename RunGPGV to ExecGPGV and move it to apt-pkg/contrib/gpgv.cc
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