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As requested by Henrique de Moraes Holschuh, here comes
an option to disable TLS support. If the option is set
to false, the internal TLS layer is disabled.
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Gbp-Dch: ignore
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GnuTLS can already have data pending in its buffers, we need
to to drain that first otherwise select() might block
indefinitely.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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This makes testing easier and prepares us for the
transition.
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The http method will eventually replace the curl-based
https method, but for now, this is an opt-in experiment
that can be enabled by setting Dir::Bin::Methods::https
to "http".
Known issues:
- We do not support HTTPS proxies yet
- We do not support proxying HTTPS connections yet (CONNECT)
- IssuerCert and SslForceVersion are unsupported
Gbp-Dch: Full
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Use std::unique_ptr<MethodFd> everywhere we used an
integer-based file descriptor before. This allows us
to implement stuff like TLS support easily.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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This will allow us to access ConfigFind() and stuff which makes
it possible for us to implement TLS support.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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An unknown code should be handled the same as the x00 code of this
group, but for redirections we used to treat 300 (and a few others)
as an error while unknown codes were considered redirections.
Instead we check now explicitly for the redirection codes we support for
redirecting (and add the 308 defined in RFC 7538) to avoid future
problems if new 3xx codes are added expecting certain behaviours.
Potentially strange would have been e.g. "305 Use Proxy" sending a
Location for the proxy to use – which wouldn't have worked and resulted
in an error anyhow, but probably confused users in the process.
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Reported-By: gcc-7
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
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This fixes issues with sourceforge where the redirector includes
such a Content-Range in a 302 redirect. Since we do not really know
what file is meant in a redirect, let's just ignore it for all
responses other than 416 and 206.
Maybe we should also get rid of the other errors, and just ignore
the field in those cases as well?
LP: #1657567
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Most of them in (old) code comments. The two instances of user visible
string changes the po files of the manpages are fixed up as well.
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
Reported-By: spellintian
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rred can fail for a plentory of reasons, but its failure is usually
recoverable (Ign lines) so it shouldn't leak unrequested debug messages
to an observing user.
Closes: #850759
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Curl requires URLs to be urlencoded. We are however giving it
undecoded URLs. This causes it go completely nuts if there is
a space in the URI, producing requests like:
GET /a file HTTP/1.1
which the servers then interpret as a GET request for "/a" with
HTTP version "file" or some other non-sense.
This works around the issue by encoding the path component of
the URL. I'm not sure if we should encode other parts of the URL
as well, this one seems to do the trick for the actual issue at
hand.
A more correct fix is to avoid the dequoting and (re-)quoting
of URLs when a redirect occurs / a new request is sent. That's
been on the radar for probably a year or two now, but nobody
bothered implementing that yet.
LP: #1651923
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This 'method' is the abstract base for http and https and should as such
be called out like this rather using an easily confused name.
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
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Having a Reset(bool) method to partially reset certain variables like
the download size always were strange, so this commit splits the
ServerState into an additional RequestState living on the stack for as
long as we deal with this request causing an automatic "reset".
There is much to do still to make this code look better, but this is a
good first step which compiles cleanly and passes all tests, so keeping
it as history might be beneficial and due to avoiding explicit memory
allocations it ends up fixing a small memory leak in https, too.
Closes: #440057
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Change the trust level check to allow downgrading an Untrusted
option to weak (APT::Hashes::SHA1::Weak "yes";), so it prints
a warning instead of an error; and change the default values
for SHA1 and RIPE-MD/160 from Weak to Untrusted.
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We report warnings from apt-key this way already since
29c590951f812d9e9c4f17706e34f2c3315fb1f6, so reporting errors seems like
a good addition. Most of those errors aren't really from apt-key
through, but from the code setting up and actually calling it which used
to just print to stderr which might or might not intermix them with
(other) progress lines in update calls. Having them as proper error
messages in the system means that the errors are actually collected
later on for the list instead of ending up with our relatively generic
but in those cases bogus hint regarding "is gpgv installed?".
The effective difference is minimal as the errors apply mostly to
systems which have far worse problems than a not as nice looking error
message, which makes this pretty hard to test – but at least now the
hint that your system is broken can be read in proper order (= there
aren't many valid cases in which the permissions of /tmp are messed up…).
LP: #1522988
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Suggested in #529794
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[Comment from commiter:] I have the feeling that the issue itself is
fixed for a while already as nowadays we have testcases involving a
webserver closing the connection on error (look for "closeOnError") and
no even remotely recent reports about it, but moving the content
clearance above the failure report is a valid change and shouldn't hurt.
Closes: #465572
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The 0.0.0.0:0 tor reports is pretty useless by itself, but even if an IP
would be reported it is better to show the user the hostname we wanted
the proxy to connect to in the same error message. We improve upon it
further by looking for this bind address in particular and remap error
messages slightly to give users a better chance of figuring out what
went wrong. Upstream Tor can't do that as it is technically wrong.
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Commit 3af3ac2f5ec007badeded46a94be2bd06b9917a2 (released in 1.3~pre1)
implements proper fallback for SRV, but that works actually too good
as the RFC defines that such an SRV record should indicate that the
server doesn't provide this service and apt should respect this.
The solution is hence to fail again as requested even if that isn't what
the user (and perhaps even the server admins) wanted. At least we will
print a message now explicitly mentioning SRV to point people in the
right direction.
Reported-In: https://bugs.kali.org/view.php?id=3525
Reported-By: Raphaël Hertzog
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In gpgv1 GOODSIG (and the other messages of status-fd) are documented as
sending the long keyid. In gpgv2 it is documented to be either long
keyid or the fingerprint. At the moment it is still the long keyid, but
the documentation hints at the possibility of changing this.
We care about this for Signed-By support as we detect this way if the
right fingerprint has signed this file (or not). The check itself is
done via VALIDSIG which always is a fingerprint, but there must also be
a GOODSIG (as expired sigs are valid, too) found to be accepted which
wouldn't be found in the fingerprint-case and the signature hence
refused.
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memcpy is marked as nonnull for its input, but ignores the input anyhow
if the declared length is zero. Our SHA2 implementations do this as
well, it was "just" MD5 and SHA1 missing, so we add the length check
here as well as along the callstack as it is really pointless to do all
these method calls for "nothing".
Reported-By: gcc -fsanitize=undefined
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Gbp-Dch: ignore
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Gbp-Dch: ignore
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In 105503b4b470c124bc0c271bd8a50e25ecbe9133 we got a warning implemented
for unreadable files which greatly improves the behavior of apt update
already as everything will work as long as we don't need the keys
included in these files. The behavior if they are needed is still
strange through as update will fail claiming missing keys and a manual
test (which the user will likely perform as root) will be successful.
Passing the new warning generated by apt-key through to apt is a bit
strange from an interface point of view, but basically duplicating the
warning code in multiple places doesn't feel right either. That means we
have no translation for the message through as apt-key has no i18n yet.
It also means that if the user has a bunch of sources each of them will
generate a warning for each unreadable file which could result in quite
a few duplicated warnings, but "too many" is better than none.
Closes: 834973
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The implementation of the generic config fallback did the fallback in
the wrong order so that the least specific option wasn't the last value
picked but in fact the first one… doh!
So in the bugreports case http -> https -> http::<hostname> ->
https::<hostname> while it should have been the reverse as before.
Regression-In: 30060442025824c491f58887ca7369f3c572fa57
Closes: 834642
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If a server closes a connection after sending us a file that tends to
mean that its a type of server who always closes the connection – it is
therefore relatively pointless to try pipelining with it even if it
isn't a problem by itself: apt is just restarting the pipeline each
time after it got served one file and the connection is closed.
The problem starts if one or more proxies are between the server and apt
and they disagree about how the connection should be as in the
bugreporters case where the responses apt gets contain both Keep-Alive
and Proxy-Connection headers (which apt both ignores) indicating a
proxy is trying to keep a connection open while the response also
contains "Connection: close" indicating the opposite which apt
understands and respects as it is required to do.
We avoid stepping into this abyss by not performing pipelining anymore
if we got a respond with the indication to close connection if the
response was otherwise a success – error messages are sent by some
servers via this method as their pages tend to be created dynamically
and hence their size isn't known a priori to them.
Closes: #832113
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If the server told us in a previous request that it isn't supporting
Ranges with bytes via an Accept-Ranges header missing bytes, we don't
try to formulate requests using Ranges.
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We keep various information bits about the server around, some only
effecting the currently handled file (like sizes) while others
should be persistent (like pipeline detections). http used to reset all
file-related manually, which is a bit silly if we already have a Reset()
method – which does reset all through –, so extending it with a
parameter for reuse and calling it from https too (as this was
previously resetting by just creating a new state struct – it uses no
value of the persistent state-keeping yet as it supports no pipelining).
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
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It seems completely pointless from a server-POV to sent empty header
fields, so most of them don't do it (simply proven by this limitation
existing since day one) – but it is technically allowed by the RFC as
the surounding whitespaces are optional and Github seems to like sending
"X-Geo-Block-List:\r\n" since recently (bug reports in other http
clients indicate July) at least sometimes as the reporter claims to have
seen it on https only even through it can happen with both.
Closes: 834048
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With apts http transport supporting socks5h proxies and all the work
in terms of configuration of methods based on the name it is called with
it becomes surprisingly easy to implement Tor support equally (and
perhaps even a bit exceeding) what is available currently in
apt-transport-tor.
How this will turn out to be handled packaging wise we will see in
https://lists.debian.org/deity/2016/08/msg00012.html , but until this is
resolved we can add the needed support without actively enabling it for
now, so that this can be tested better.
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Doing a direct connect to an .onion address (if you don't happen to use
it as a local domain, which you shouldn't) is bound to fail and does
leak the information that you do use Tor and which hidden service you
wanted to connect to to a DNS server. Worse, if the DNS is poisoned and
actually resolves tricking a user into believing the setup would work
correctly…
This does block also the usage of wrappers like torsocks with apt, but
with native support available and advertised in the error message this
shouldn't really be an issue.
Inspired-by: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1228457
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Socks support is a requested feature in sofar that the internet is
actually believing Acquire::socks::Proxy would exist. It doesn't and
this commit isn't adding it as that isn't how our configuration works,
but it allows Acquire::http::Proxy="socks5h://…". The HTTPS method was
changed already to support socks proxies (all versions) via curl. This
commit implements only SOCKS5 (RFC1928) with no auth or pass&user auth
(RFC1929), but not GSSAPI which is required by the RFC. The 'h' in the
protocol name further indicates that DNS resolution is delegated to the
socks proxy rather than performed locally.
The implementation works and was tested with Tor as socks proxy for
which implementing socks5h only can actually be considered a feature.
Closes: 744934
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The https method implemented for a long while now a hardcoded fallback
to the same options in http, which, while it works, is rather inflexible
if we want to allow the methods to use another name to change their
behavior slightly, like apt-transport-tor does to https – most of the
diff being s#https#tor#g which then fails to do the full circle
fallthrough tor -> https -> http for https sources. With this config
infrastructure this could be implemented now.
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cURL which backs our https implementation can handle redirects on its
own, but by dealing with them on our own we gain finer control over which
redirections will be performed (we don't like https → http) and by whom
so that redirections to other hosts correctly spawn a new https method
dealing with these instead of letting the current one deal with it.
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Having the detection handled in specific (http) workers means that a
redirection loop over different hostnames isn't detected. Its also not a
good idea have this implement in each method independently even if it
would work
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Closes: #623443
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Bye, bye, old friend.
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Introduce an initial CMake buildsystem. This build system can build
a fully working apt system without translation or documentation.
The FindBerkelyDB module is from kdelibs, with some small adjustements
to also look in db5 directories.
Initial work on this CMake build system started in 2009, and was
resumed in August 2016.
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Followup of b58e2c7c56b1416a343e81f9f80cb1f02c128e25.
Still a regression of sorts of 8b79c94af7f7cf2e5e5342294bc6e5a908cacabf.
Closes: 832044
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If another file in the transaction fails and hence dooms the transaction
we can end in a situation in which a -patched file (= rred writes the
result of the patching to it) remains in the partial/ directory.
The next apt call will perform the rred patching again and write its
result again to the -patched file, but instead of starting with an empty
file as intended it will override the content previously in the file
which has the same result if the new content happens to be longer than
the old content, but if it isn't parts of the old content remain in the
file which will pass verification as the new content written to it
matches the hashes and if the entire transaction passes the file will be
moved the lists/ directory where it might or might not trigger errors
depending on if the old content which remained forms a valid file
together with the new content.
This has no real security implications as no untrusted data is involved:
The old content consists of a base file which passed verification and a
bunch of patches which all passed multiple verifications as well, so the
old content isn't controllable by an attacker and the new one isn't
either (as the new content alone passes verification). So the best an
attacker can do is letting the user run into the same issue as in the
report.
Closes: #831762
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The rewrite in 742f67eaede80d2f9b3631d8697ebd63b8f95427 is based on the
assumption that the pipeline will always be at least one item short each
time it is called, but the logs in #832113 suggest that this isn't
always the case. I fail to see how at the moment, but the old
implementation had this behavior, so restoring it can't really hurt, can
it?
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Also fixes message itself to mention the correct option name as noticed
in #832113.
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We read the entire input file we want to patch anyhow, so we can also
calculate the hash for that file and compare it with what he had
expected it to be.
Note that this isn't really a security improvement as a) the file we
patch is trusted & b) if the input is incorrect, the result will hardly be
matching, so this is just for failing slightly earlier with a more
relevant error message (althrough, in terms of rred its ignored and
complete download attempt instead).
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Instead of only trying the first host we get via SRV, we try them all as
we are supposed to and if that isn't working we try to connect to the
host itself as if we hadn't seen any SRV records. This was already the
intend of the old code, but it failed to hide earlier problems for the
next call, which would unconditionally fail then resulting in an all
around failure to connect. With proper stacking we can also keep the
error messages of each call around (and in the order tried) so if the
entire connection fails we can report all the things we have tried while
we discard the entire stack if something works out in the end.
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