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gpg doesn't give use a UID on NODATA, which we were "expecting" (but not
using for anything), but just an error number. Instead of collecting
these as badsigners which will trigger a "invald signature" error with
remarks like "NODATA 1" we instead adapt a message similar to the NODATA
error of a clearsigned file (which is actually not reached anymore as we
split them up, which fails with a NOSPLIT error, which uses the same
general error message).
In other words: Not a security relevant change, just a user experience
improvement as we now point them to the most likely cause of the
problem instead of saying "invalid signature" which would point them in
the direction of the archive being broken (for everyone) instead.
Closes: 823746
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A keyring file can include multiple keys, so its only fair for
transitions and such to support multiple fingerprints as well.
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We parse the messages we receive into two big categories: Most of the
messages have a keyid as well as a userid and as they are errors we want
to show the userids as well. The other category is also errors, but have
no userid (like NO_PUBKEY). Explicitly expressing this in code should
make it a bit easier to look at and it also help in dropping additional
fields or just the newline at the end consistently.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Daniel Kahn Gillmor highlights in the bugreport that security isn't
improving by having the user import additional keys – especially as
importing keys securely is hard.
The bugreport was initially about dropping the warning to a notice, but
in given the previously mentioned observation and the fact that we
weren't printing a warning (or a notice) for expired or revoked keys
providing a signature we drop it completely as the code to display a
message if this was the only key is in another path – and is considered
critical.
Closes: 618445
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Signatures on data can have an expiration date, too, which we hadn't
handled previously explicitly (no problem – gpg still has a non-zero
exit code so apt notices the invalid signature) so the error message
wasn't as helpful as it could be (aka mentioning the key signing it).
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The upstream documentation says about KEYEXPIRED:
"This status line is not very useful". Indeed, it doesn't mention which
key is expired, and suggests to use the other message which does.
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when using the https transport mechanism, $no_proxy is ignored if apt is
getting it's proxy information from $https_proxy (as opposed to
Acquire::https::Proxy somewhere in apt config). if the source of proxy
information is Acquire::https::Proxy set in apt.conf (or apt.conf.d),
then $no_proxy is honored.
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We have this situation in cases were parts of the transaction are
refused (e.g. in a hashsum mismatch) and rerun the update (e.g. in the
hope that we get a mirror which is synced this time).
Previously we would ask the server with an if-range and in the best case
recieve a 416 in response (less featureful server might end up giving us
the entire file again or we get the wrong file this time giving us a
hashsum mismatch…), which is a waste of time if we know already by
checking the hashsums that we got the complete and correct file.
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With the previous fix for file applied we can again hit repositories
which contain uncompressed empty files, which since the introduction of
the central store: method wasn't accounted for anymore as we forbid
empty compressed files.
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A silly of-by-one error in the stripping of the extension to check for
the uncompressed filename broken in an attempt to support all
compressions in commit a09f6eb8fc67cd2d836019f448f18580396185e5.
Fixing this highlights also mistakes in the handling of the Alt-Filename
in libapt which would cause apt to remove the file from the repository
(if root has the needed rights – aka the disk isn't readonly or similar)
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Introduces APT::Hashes::<NAME> with entries Untrusted and Weak
which can be set to true to cause the hash to be treated as
untrusted and/or weak.
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Our own gpgv method can declare a digest algorithm as untrusted and
handles these as worthless signatures. If gpgv comes with inbuilt
untrusted (which is called weak in official terminology) which it e.g.
does for MD5 in recent versions we should handle it in the same way.
To check this we use the most uncommon still fully trusted hash as a
configureable one via a hidden config option to toggle through all of
the three states a hash can be in.
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Using erase(pos) is invalid in our case here as pos must be a valid and
derefenceable iterator, which isn't the case for an end-iterator (like
if we had no good signature).
The problem runs deeper still through as VALIDSIG is a keyid while
GOODSIG is just a longid so comparing them will always fail.
Closes: 818910
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There was a complaint that, in the previous message,
the key fingerprint could be mistaken for a SHA1 digest
due to the (SHA1) after it.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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This should be easy to extend in the future and allow us to simplify
the error handling cases somewhat.
Thanks: Ron Lee for wording suggestions
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We will drop support for those in the future.
Also adjust the std::array to be a std::vector, as that's easier to
maintain.
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This can be used by workers to send warnings to the main
program. The messages will be passed to _error->Warning()
by APT with the URI prepended.
We are not going to make that really public now, as the
interface might change a bit.
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We added weak signatures to BadSigners, meaning that a Release file
signed by both a weak signature and a strong signature would be
rejected; preventing people from migrating from DSA to RSA keys
in a sane way.
Instead of using BadSigners, treat weak signatures like expired
keys: They are no good signatures, and they are worthless.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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This keeps a list of weak digest algorithms. For now, only MD5
is disabled, as SHA1 breaks to many repos.
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This reverts commit 76a71a1237d22c1990efbc19ce0e02aacf572576.
That commit broke the test suite.
Gbp-Dch: ignore
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ERRSIG is created whenever a key uses an unknown/weak digest
algorithm, for example. This allows us to report a more useful
error than just "unknown apt-key error.":
The following signatures were invalid: ERRSIG 13B00F1FD2C19886 1 2 01 1457609403 5
While still not being the best reportable error message, it's
better than unknown apt-key error and hopefully redirects users
to complain to their repository owners.
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We basically ignored errors from writing and flushing, let's
not do that.
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Reported-By: cppcheck
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Just enabling it for anyone breaks with HTTP/1.0 servers and
proxies sometimes.
Closes: #810796
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There is no reason to enforce that the file we start the bootstrap with
is compressed with a compressor which is available online. This allows
us to change the on-disk format as well as deals with repositories
adding/removing support for a specific compressor.
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Adding a new compressor method meant adding a new method as well – even
if that boilt down to just linking to our generalized decompressor with
a new name. That is unneeded busywork if we can instead just call the
generalized decompressor and let it figure out which compressor to use
based on the filenames rather than by program name.
For compatibility we ship still 'gzip', 'bzip2' and co, but they are
just links to our "new" 'store' method.
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Remove the SingleInstance flag so we can use the new randomized
queue feature to run parallel.
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The PopFromSrvRecs() already removed the entry from the active
list, so the extra SrvRecords.erase() was incorrect.
Git-Dch: ignore
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Buffered writes improve performance a lot, given that we spent
about 78% of the time in _write.
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This accidentally slipped in in a previous commit, but it should
be used only for testing mode.
Reported-By: David Kalnischkies <david@kalnischkies.de>
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This converts all callers that read machine-generated data,
callers that might work with user input are not converted.
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This introduces a -t mode in which the first argument is input,
the second is output and the remaining are diffs.
This allows us to test patching compressed files, which are
detected using their file extension.
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ssh expects various configuration bits to be usable like known hosts,
possibly keys and co. Setting this up needs some user work for probably
not a whole lot of benefits, so instead of forcing it upon users on
upgrade disable dropping for it by default.
Closes: 806511
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Regression intoduced in 23e64f6d0facf9610c1042326ad9850e071e8349
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In ce1f3a2c we started warning about failing unlinking, which we
consistently do for directories. That isn't a problem as directories
usually aren't in the places we do want to clean up – with the potential
exeception of "lost+found", so lets ignore it like we ignore our own
partial/ subdirectory.
Closes: 805424
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AI_IDN is a glibc extension, but we can worry about this at the time
actually anyone is seriously trying apt on non-glibc systems.
Closes: 763437
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Reported-By: cppcheck
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Allows users who know what they are getting themselves into with this
trick to e.g. disable privilege dropping for e.g. file:// until they can
fix up the permissions on those repositories. It helps also the test
framework and people with a similar setup (= me) to run in less modified
environments.
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Continueing on the track of dropping privileges in all methods, lets
drop it in copy, too, as the reasoning for it is very similar to file
and the interaction between the too quiet interesting as copy kinda
surfed as a fallback for file not being able to read the file. Both now
show a better error message as well as it was previously claiming to
have a hashsum mismatch, given that it couldn't read the file.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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This flags is generally handy to avoid having to deal with ipv6 results on an
ipv4-only system, but it prevents e.g. the testcases from working if the
testsystem has no configured address at the moment (expect loopback), so
allow it to be sidestepped and let the testcases sidestep it.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Unlinking /dev/null is bad, we shouldn't do that. Also, we should print
at least a warning if we tried to unlink a file but didn't manage to
pull it of (ignoring the case were the file is /dev/null or doesn't
exist in the first place).
This got triggered by a relatively unlikely to cause problem in
pkgAcquire::Worker::PrepareFiles which would while temporary
uncompressed files (which are set to keep compressed) figure out that to
files are the same and prepare for sharing by deleting them. Bad move.
That also shows why not printing a warning is a bad idea as this hide
the error for in non-root test runs.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Detecting network errors has some benefits in the acquire system as if
we can't connect to a host trying it for a million files is pointless.
http and co which use connect.cc deal with this, but https which uses
curl had connection failures as "normal" errors which could potentially
be worked around (like trying Release instead of the failed InRelease).
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Commit 653ef26c70dc9c0e2cbfdd4e79117876bb63e87d broke the camels back in
sofar that everything works in terms of our internal use of copy:/, but
external use is completely destroyed. This is kinda the reverse of what
happened in "parallel" in the sid branch, where external use was mostly
fine, internal and external exploded on the GzipIndexes option.
We fix this now by rewriting our internal use by letting copy:/ only do
what the name suggests it does: Copy files and not uncompress them
on-the-fly. Then we teach copy and the uncompressors how to deal with
/dev/null and use it as destination file in case we don't want to store
the uncompressed files on disk.
Closes: 799158
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We drop it in decompressors, which are the natural next step, so if an
archive is used which isn't worldreadable (= not accessible by _apt) it
doesn't work anyway, so we just fail a bit earlier now and avoid all the
bad things which can happen over file (which could very well still be a
network resourc via NFS mounts or similar stuff, so hardly as safe as
the name might suggest at first).
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Reported-By: gcc -fsanitize=address -fno-sanitize=vptr
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Our error reporting is historically grown into some kind of mess.
A while ago I implemented stacking for the global error which is used in
this commit now to wrap calls to functions which do not report (all)
errors via return, so that only failures in those calls cause a failure
to propergate down the chain rather than failing if anything
(potentially totally unrelated) has failed at some point in the past.
This way we can avoid stopping the entire acquire process just because a
single source produced an error for example. It also means that after
the acquire process the cache is generated – even if the acquire
process had failures – as we still have the old good data around we can and
should generate a cache for (again).
There are probably more instances of this hiding, but all these looked
like the easiest to work with and fix with reasonable (aka net-positive)
effects.
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Reported-By: gcc
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Some additional files like 'Contents' are very big and should therefore
kept compressed on the disk, which apt-file did in the past. It also
implemented pdiff patching of these files by un- and recompressing these
files on-the-fly, with this commit we can do the same – but we can do
this in both pdiff patching styles (client and server merging) and
secured by hashes.
Hashes are in so far slightly complicated as we can't compare the hashes
of the compressed files as we might compress them differently than the
server would (different compressor versions, options, …), so we must
compare the hashes of the uncompressed content.
While this commit has changes in public headers, the classes it changes
are marked as hidden, so nobody can use them directly, which means the
ABI break is internal only.
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Reported-By: codespell
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Thanks: Julian Andres Klode
Git-Dch: ignore
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