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The previous commit returns to the possibility of using just gpgv for
verification proposes. There is one problem through: We can't enforce a
specific keyid without using gpg, but our acquire method can as it
parses gpgv output anyway, so it can deal with good signatures from not
expected signatures and treats them as unknown keys instead.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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If all keyrings are simple keyrings we can merge the keyrings with cat
rather than doing a detour over gpg --export | --import (see #790665),
which means 'apt-key verify' can do without gpg and just use gpgv as
before the merging change.
We declare this gpgv usage explicit now in the dependencies. This isn't
a new dependency as gnupg as well as debian-archive-keyring depend on
and we used it before unconditionally, just that we didn't declare it.
The handling of the merged keyring needs to be slightly different as our
merged keyring can end up containing the same key multiple times, but at
least currently gpg does remove only the first occurrence with
--delete-keys, so we move the handling to a if one is gone, all are gone
rather than an (implicit) quid pro quo or even no effect.
Thanks: Daniel Kahn Gillmor for the suggestion
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The output of gpg slightly changes in 2.1 which breaks the testcase, but
the real problem is that this branch introduces a new default keyring
format (which is called keybox) and mixing it with simple keyrings (the
previous default format) has various problems like failing in the keybox
to keyring import (#790665) or [older] gpgv versions not being able to
deal with keyboxes (and newer versions as well currently:
https://bugs.gnupg.org/gnupg/issue2025).
We fix this by being a bit more careful in who creates keyrings (aka: we
do it or we take a simple keyring as base) to ensure we always have a
keyring instead of a keybox. This way we can ensure that any version
combination of gpv/gpgv2 and gnupg/gnupg2 without doing explicit version
checks and use the same code for all of them.
Closes: 781042
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Limits which key(s) can be used to sign a repository. Not immensely useful
from a security perspective all by itself, but if the user has
additional measures in place to confine a repository (like pinning) an
attacker who gets the key for such a repository is limited to its
potential and can't use the key to sign its attacks for an other (maybe
less limited) repository… (yes, this is as weak as it sounds, but having
the capability might come in handy for implementing other stuff later).
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Conflicts:
apt-pkg/acquire-item.cc
cmdline/apt-key.in
methods/https.cc
test/integration/test-apt-key
test/integration/test-multiarch-foreign
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gnupg is case-insensitive about keyids, so back then apt-key called it
directly any keyid was accepted, but now that we work more with the
keyid ourself we regressed to require uppercase keyids by accident.
This is also inconsistent with other apt-key commands which still use
gnupg directly. A single case-insensitive grep and we are fine again.
Closes: 781696
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We use test{success,failure} now all over the place in the framework, so
its only consequencial to do this in the situations in which we test for
a specific output as well.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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apt-key given a long keyid reports just "OK" all the time, but doesn't
delete the mentioned key as it doesn't find the key.
Note: In debian/experimental this was closed with
29f1b977100aeb6d6ebd38923eeb7a623e264ffe which just added the testcase
as the rewrite of apt-key had fixed this as well.
Closes: 754436
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Git-Dch: Ignore
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apt-key creates trusted.gpg if it needs it with 644 nowadays, but before
it ensured this, it was gpg creating it, which gives it by default 600.
Not a problem as long as our gpgv is run as root, but now that we drop
privileges we have to ensure that we can also read trusted.gpg files
created by earlier apt-key versions.
Closes: 647001
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The original patch does not apply against the rewritten apt-key,
but an additional test doesn't hurt.
Closes: 754436
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We were down to at most two keyrings before, but gnupg upstream plans
dropping support for multiple keyrings in the longrun, so with a
single keyring we hope to be future proof – and 'apt-key adv' isn't a
problem anymore as every change to the keys is merged back, so we have
now the same behavior as before, but support an unlimited amount of
trusted.gpg.d keyrings.
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Git-Dch: Ignore
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If both are available APT will still prefer gpg over gpg2 as it is a bit
more lightweight, but it shouldn't be a problem to use one or the other
(at least at the moment, who knows what will happen in the future).
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Having fragement files means there is a good chance that there is one
key per keyring, so deal with that as well as with setups in which
keyrings are linked into trusted.gpg.d as we can't just modify those
files (they might be in /usr for example).
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Might come in handy for more than just a simple testcase.
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